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THE RECEPTION OF HANS KELSEN’S LEGAL THEORY IN THE
UNITED STATES: A SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗
Abstract
The Essay explores the reasons underlying opposition to Hans
Kelsen's approach to the law within the U.S. legal academy. The
vehemence with which legal scholars within the United States rejected
Kelsen's philosophy of law is best understood as a product of numerous
factors, some philosophical, some political and some having to do with
professional developments within the legal academy itself. Because
philosophical and political opposition to Kelsen's legal philosophy has
been well-explored in earlier articles, this Essay discusses those topics
briefly in Part I and then sets out in Part II a sociological model that
grounds the academy's rejection of Kelsen's pure theory of law in
professionalization processes already well underway when Kelsen
arrived in the United States.
Kelsen had little impact in the U.S. legal academy not only because
his brand of legal positivism was uncongenial to a U.S. audience. He
also had little impact because he arrived in the United States just as the
twin innovations of Legal Realism and the professionalization of the
legal academy were solidifying their grips on the U.S. legal community.
His mode of legal thought and his approach to legal education could not
be accommodated within the newly-created discursive practice of the
legal professoriate, and there was thus little possibility that his approach
could be accommodated within that realm.

INTRODUCTION
At the time of the Nazi seizure of power, Hans Kelsen was
Germany’s leading legal theorist and the Dean of the Faculty of
Law at the University of Cologne.1 Forced from his university
post because of his Jewish ancestry, Kelsen fled to Geneva in 1933
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RUDOLF ALADÁR MÉTALL, HANS KELSEN: LEBEN UND WERK
(Vienna: Verlag Franz Deuticke, 1969), at 57-63.
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and to the United States in 1940.2 By that time, Kelsen’s
reputation was already well-established in the United States. In
1934, Roscoe Pound, a legal theorist and Dean of the Harvard Law
School, lauded Kelsen as “undoubtedly the leading jurist of the
time.”3
After his immigration to the United States, Kelsen spent 30
years actively engaged in scholarship and teaching in the United
States and at visiting professorships abroad,4 but his approach to
legal theory never found a following within the legal academy of
the United States, even as his reputation grew internationally. Karl
Llewellyn, a leading practitioner of the Realist school of
jurisprudence, regarded Kelsen’s work as “utterly sterile,”
although he acknowledged Kelsen’s intellect.5 Echoing Oliver
Wendell Holmes’ famous dictum that the life of the law is not
logic but experience, Harold Laski denounced Kelsen’s legal
theory as a sterile “exercise in logic and not in life.”6 To this day,
Kelsen and his ideas are rarely considered in the U.S. legal
academy. 7
Recently, one of the United States’ leading
2

Id. at 63-64, 76-77.
Roscoe Pound, Law and the Science of Law in Recent Theories, in 43
YALE L.J. 525, 532 (1934).
4
During the time that he was living in the United States, Kelsen taught
and/or held visiting professorships in Geneva, Newport, The Hague,
Vienna, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsingfors, Edinburgh and Chicago.
He received honorary doctorates from Utrecht, Harvard, Chicago,
Mexico, Berkeley, Salamanca, Berlin, Vienna, New York, Paris, and
Salzburg.
Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Bibliographical Note and
Biography, 9 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 391, 392 (1998).
5
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), at 356, n.6
(“I see Kelsen’s work as utterly sterile, save in by-products that derive
from his taking his shrewd eyes, for a moment, off what he thinks of as
‘pure law.’”).
6
HAROLD LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS (4th ed.) (London: Allen
& Unwin, 1938), at vi.
7
Albert Calsamiglia, For Kelsen, 13 RATIO JURIS 196, 99 (2000) (“At
present, in North America, Kelsen is practically unknown, and with only
a few exceptions . . . American [j]urisprudence has totally ignored his
3
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philosophers of law contended that Kelsen has no following in the
United States, at least among philosophers of law, because H.L.A.
Hart demonstrated “that two central features of his jurisprudential
view seem to be mistaken.”8
Two simple quotations exemplify the extent to which Kelsen’s
entire approach to law is anathema to U.S. legal scholars. In the
two areas where one might expect Kelsen’s influence to be
unavoidable—international law and jurisprudence—opposition to
his thought is most pronounced. As is well-known, Kelsen sought
to create a science of law as an autonomous field, divorced from
politics and morality.9 But when students in the United States are
introduced to international law through one of the most popular
U.S. casebooks, the very first sentence they confront in Chapter 1,
Section 1 reads as follows: “First, law is politics.”10

contribution.”). The United States’ most widely cited legal theorist,
Judge Richard Posner, admitted that, until recently, he had never read
Kelsen. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), at 250.
8
Brian Leiter, Why don’t American philosophers of law talk about
Kelsen? Brian Leiter’s Legal Philosophy Blog (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://leiterlegalphilosophy.typepad.com/leiter/2007/10/why-dont-amer1.html.
9
See Hans Kelsen, “‘Foreword’ to the Second Printing of Main
Problems in the Theory of Public Law,” in NORMATIVITY AND NORMS:
ESSAYS ON KELSEN (Stanley L. Paulson (ed.)) (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon
Press, 1998), at 1, 1-2 (“The purity of the theory is to be secured against
he claims of a so-called ‘sociological’ point of view, which employs
causal, scientific methods to appropriate the law as a part of natural
reality. And it is to be secured against the natural law theory, which, by
ignoring the fundamental referent found exclusively in the positive law,
takes legal theory out of the realm of positive legal norms and into that
ethico-political postulates.”)
10
LORI DAMROSCH, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed.) (St. Paul, MN: West, 2001), at 1. The sentence at
issue is presented in an excerpt from an essay by one of the casebook’s
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Leading U.S. legal philosophers similarly rejected Kelsen’s
fundamental principles. In 1949, for example, after Kelsen had
been teaching in the United States for nearly a decade, Lon Fuller,
the celebrated U.S. legal scholar and theorist, noted that Kelsen
had “excluded justice from his studies because it is an ‘irrational
ideal’ and therefore ‘not subject to cognition.’” Fuller noted that
“the whole structure of [Kelsen’s] theory derives from this
exclusion.”11 But Fuller voiced his agreement with Jerome Hall,
who in his influential Readings in Jurisprudence stated that
jurisprudence must start with justice.12 Leading U.S. academics’
approach to the law derives from principles antithetical to Kelsen’s
pure theory of law.
In this Essay, I shall explore the reasons underlying opposition
to Kelsen’s approach within the U.S. legal academy. The
vehemence with which legal scholars within the United States
rejected Kelsen’s philosophy of law is best understood as a product
of numerous factors, some philosophical, some political and some
having to do with professional developments within the legal
academy itself. Because I believe that philosophical and political
opposition to Kelsen’s legal philosophy has been well-explored in
earlier articles, I will discuss those topics briefly in Part I and then
set out in Part II a sociological model that grounds the academy’s
rejection of Kelsen’s pure theory of law in professionalization
processes already well underway when Kelsen arrived in the
United States.
My aim in this Essay is neither to portray Kelsen as a victim
nor as an overlooked genius who offered elixirs that could have
been used to treat the various ailments afflicting the U.S. legal
academy. Although shunned by the U.S. legal academy, Kelsen

authors, Louis Henkin, who has been a leading figure in his field within
the U.S. academy for decades.
11
Lon L. Fuller, The Place and Uses of Jurisprudence in the Law
School Curriculum, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495, 496 (1949). It is also
significant that Fuller’s essay appears in the first volume of a new journal
that has since become the dominant U.S. journal on legal pedagogy.
12
Id. (citing JEROME HALL, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1938)).
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enjoyed a brilliant career and cannot be portrayed as a person to be
pitied. I am moreover, at this point in my immersion in Kelsen’s
legal theory, agnostic as to whether, or to what extent, the U.S.
legal academy would benefit from a belated encounter with
Kelsen. Rather, the Essay is an exercise in the sociology of
knowledge and a contribution to the intellectual history of the U.S.
legal academy. The fact that Kelsen plays almost no role in that
history says relatively little about Kelsen and is intended to
illustrate the structures of openness and exclusions within which a
professional modality develops. Historians of the legal profession
in the United States have tackled the more obvious and sinister
exclusions (based on race, gender and class) attendant to the
professionalization process.13 The story behind the exclusion of
alternative models of legal theory has yet to be told.14
I. KELSEN AND THE POLITICS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF LEGAL
REALISM
Immediately upon arriving in the United States, Kelsen was
accorded the dignities to which his reputation entitled him.
Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State15 was selected as the
first volume of the American Academy of Legal Scholars’

13

See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 1983); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
14
In a delightfully iconoclastic essay, John Henry Schlegel provides
examples of ways in which powerful figures within the U.S. legal
academy effectively opposed proposed pedagogical innovations, but he
does not address theoretical exclusions. John Henry Schlegel, Between
the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The
Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEG. EDUC.
311, 323 (1985).
15
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1945).
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Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series.16 He was also invited
to give the inaugural Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures at Harvard
Law School, and those lectures were collected in a Harvard
publication, Law and Peace in International Relations.17 And yet,
although his publications could not have appeared in more
prominent venues, they garnered little attention in law journals.18
As Stanley Paulson noted in his fine essay on the Kelsen reception
in the United States, the few detailed discussions of Kelsen’s work
to appear in U.S. law reviews were written by fellow émigrés who
had undertaken a thorough study of the pure theory of law in
Europe before coming to America.19 Most significantly, Kelsen,
one of Europe’s foremost legal scholars, was unable to obtain a
full-time teaching position at any U.S. law school. Instead, he
joined the faculty of the political science department of the
University of California, Berkeley.20
A. Realist Opposition to Kelsen’s Philosophy of Law
U.S. jurisprudence in the twentieth century and to this day has
prided itself on its hard-headed realism, or pragmatism. Not only
is it considered a cliché to say that “we are all Realists now;”
apparently, it is now recognized as cliché to point out the cliché.21

16

R. K. Gooch, Review of KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
THE STATE, 32 VA. L. REV. 212, 213 (1945).
17
KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1942).
18
See R. S. Clark, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, 22 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 170, 170 (1969) (“noting that the 1967 translation of Kelsen’s
PURE THEORY OF LAW had “largely escaped the notice of jurisprudential
commentators and citing only two other “substantial” reviews).
19
Stanley L. Paulson, Die Rezeption Kelsens in Amerika, in REINE
RECHTSLEHRE IM SPIEGEL IHRER FORTSETZER UND KRITIKER (Ota
Winberger & Werner Krawietz (eds.)) (Vienna: Springer, 1988), at 179,
180.
20
Edwin Patterson, Hans Kelsen and His Pure Theory of Law, 40 CAL.
L. REV. 5, 5 (1952).
21
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1986), at 229; Michael Seven Green,
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Thus, to the extent that Kelsen’s approach to law appeared to be at
odds with Legal Realism, it is not surprising that it was not
welcomed by Kelsen’s colleagues within the U.S. legal academy.
Before Realism arrived on the scene, U.S. legal scholarship
was dominated by a formalist concept of law, which stressed “the
purported autonomy and closure of the legal world and the
predominance of formal logic within this autonomous universe.”22
Realism defined itself in opposition to this idea of law,23 and
Kelsen’s approach must have appeared to the Realists to be a
version of the formalism that they had just energetically rejected
and were in the process of eliminating from legal pedagogy and
legal doctrine. The twin hallmarks of Realism are two forms of
rule-skepticism: the view that legal rules are a myth because law
consists only of the decisions of courts, and the view that statutes
and other legislative creations are too indeterminate to constrain
judges or govern their decisions.24 It is easy to understand that
Kelsen’s views would wilt in such unforgiving soil.
To this day, most legal scholars in the United States find his
work either impenetrable or not worth the bother because his
premises contradict the fundamental tenets of the U.S. approach to
law.25 While his new works were frequently reviewed in the
decade after he arrived in the United States, the translation of his
major theoretical work, the Pure Theory of Law, was largely

Legal Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917
(2005).
22
Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 TORONTO L.J.
608, 611 (2007).
23
See id. at 612 (“The realist project begins with a critique of this
formalist conception of law.”).
24
Green, Legal Realism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1917-18.
25
See Paulson, Die Rezeption Kelsens, at 180 (noting that the
American pragmatic philosophy entailed an aversion to highfalutin
philosophizing such as Kelsen’s neo-Kantianism).
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ignored and his legal theory on the whole was greeted with
indifference outside of the small academic émigré community.26
There is a small but significant exception to the general view
that “we”—that is, U.S. lawyers—are all Realists now. There
seems to be a consensus among U.S. philosophers of law that
Realism was “mercifully put to rest by H.L.A. Hart’s decisive
critique of ‘rule-skepticism’ in the seventh chapter of The Concept
of Law.” 27 However, jurisprudence courses taught at U.S. law
schools often include several sessions on Realism, and it is hard to
imagine a student emerging from a U.S. law school without at least
some immersion in Realist theory. Kelsen’s name, by contrast,
rarely graces a syllabus at a U.S. law school.28 Moreover, although
Hart’s views are just as diametrically opposed to Realism as are
Kelsen’s, Hart and Ronald Dworkin are probably the two
philosophers of law with whom U.S. law students are most likely
to be familiar. And so, while Kelsen’s opposition to Realism
provides some clues as to his lack of influence in the United States,
there must be more to it than that.
B. The Rejection of Legal Positivism as Politically Anemic
A second reason for Kelsen’s failure to reach a U.S. audience
has to do with the substantive politics of the U.S. academy in the
post-war era. Kelsen’s theory failed political litmus tests because,
26

Id. at 181. See also Fuller, The Places and Uses of Jurisprudence, 1
J. LEGAL EDUC. at 496 (“Despite Kelsen's world-wide fame, his views
are scarcely known among lawyers and law teachers in this country.”).
27
Green, Legal Realism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1917. See also
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:
Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 270 (1997) (noting that Realism
“has had almost no impact upon the mainstream of Anglo-American
jurisprudence”).
28
The exception may prove the rule. When I was a law student, a short
excerpt from Kelsen was assigned in only one of the three courses I took
that focused exclusively on legal philosophy and legal reasoning. At the
class meeting before we were to read Kelsen, our professor told us not to
bother as, he assured us, it would be incomprehensible to us. We neither
read nor discussed Kelsen in the course.
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although Kelsen personally supported parliamentary democracy,
his desire to produce a pure theory of law required him to avoid
connecting the system of law to any substantive political theory.29
As early as 1946, Gustav Radbruch declared that positivism had
rendered the German legal profession defenseless against laws
with arbitrary or even criminal content.30 Lon Fuller, one of the
most influential philosophers of law in the United States during
Kelsen’s lifetime, concluded that legal positivism had helped pave
the way for the Nazi seizure of power.31 At a time when fascism

29

See KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY,
at 3 (“One of the objections most frequently raised against the Pure
Theory is that by remaining entirely free of all politics, it stands apart
from the ebb and flow of life and is therefore worthless in terms of
science. No less frequently, however, it is said that the Pure Theory of
Law is not in a position to fulfill its own basic methodological
requirement, and is itself merely the expression of a certain political
value. But which political value?”).
30
Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht,
1 SÜDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 105, 107 (1946).
31
Fuller held an endowed chair as Professor of General Jurisprudence
at Havard Law School. In a 1954 essay, Fuller wrote that the Nazis
“would never have achieved their control over the German people had
there not been waiting to be bent to their sinister ends attitudes towards
law and government than had been centuries in the building.” These
attitudes included being “notoriously deferential to authority” and having
“faith in certain fundamental processes of government.” Lon L. Fuller,
American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEG. EDUC. 457, 466
(1954). In a 1958 exchange with H.L.A. Hart, Fuller declared
positivistic philosophy incompatible with the ideal of fidelity to law.
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 646 (1958). In the same article, Fuller
more closely links German legal positivism to the rise of fascism in
Germany. See id. at 659 (contending that positivist attitudes in the
German legal profession were “helpful to the Nazis”). Although Fuller
seems to think his view is the same as Radbruch’s, Stanley Paulson
argues that they are distinguishable. While Radbruch focused on legal
positivism under Nazism – what Paulson calls “the exoneration thesis,” –
Fuller was interested in legal positivism during the Weimar Republic,
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and totalitarianism posed genuine threats to the ascendancy of
democracy as the global model for governance, Kelsen’s theory
did not seem to U.S. academics to provide a sufficiently robust
defense of democracy or for sufficient safeguards against abuses of
the law by fascist or totalitarian governments. Writing in the mid
1950s, Richard Carpenter typified the attitude towards German
legal positivism in the U.S. academy when he criticized Germany’s
advanced culture of science and intellect for its failure to resist the
Nazi program. 32
Far from being a proper cause for surprise, this
phenomenon would seem a logical and predictable
consequence of the subjective positivism with which the
German professors were largely indoctrinated. It would
have seemed utterly inconsistent with their avowed
philosophy for a well placed positivist to risk life or
livelihood by any overt resistance to Nazi theories. If any
did so, he must have appeared to his more consistent
brethren as an emotional fool or perhaps as a psychopathic
masochist with a martyr complex.33
At the very least, the ad hominem aspect of this criticism is
poorly informed.34 Moreover, in his thorough study of Weimar

what Paulson calls “the causal thesis.” Paulson, Lon L. Fuller, Gustav
Rabruch and the “Positivist” Theses, 13 LAW & PHIL. 313, 314 (1994).
32
See Richard V. Carpenter, The Problem of Value Judgments as
Norms of Law, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 163, 167 (1954).
33
Id.
34
Stanley Paulson notes that “the leading spokesmen for Weimar legal
positivism stood very far removed from the Nazi party” and “were
known as opponents of the new Nazi regime.” Paulson, “Positivist”
Theses, 13 LAW & PHIL., at 347. Specifically, Paulson has in mind:
Gerhard Anschütz, who retired rather than teach in a Nazi university;
Richard Thoma, who continued to teach but did not do the bidding of the
Nazi regime; Walter Jellinek, Hans Kelsen and Hans Nawiasky, all of
whom the Nazis purged from their university posts; and Gustav
Radbruch, who endured “internal exile” during the Third Reich. Id. at
345-46.
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constitutionalism and legal positivism, Peter Caldwell establishes
that most Weimar legal theorists were only lukewarm republicans,
but he avoids any argument that a more robustly republican
constitutional theory could have prevented the collapse of the
Weimar Republic.35 He does so not because legal positivism
offered stout opposition to Nazism but because there is no
evidence that any form of legal theory has ever stood up any better
to anti-democratic threats.
In any case, U.S. critics of Kelsen who focus exclusively on the
alleged political shortcomings of his approach to law ignore a vast
corpus of legal thought that touches on a vast array of topics.
Kelsen published over 400 works during his lifetime, covering not
only topics in the field of jurisprudence but also in constitutional
law, international law, the history of law and philosophy,
contemporary politics and political theory.36 Although some
collections of scholarly essays on Kelsen’s work have appeared in
English,37 there has yet to be a serious scholarly monograph on
Kelsen’s legal theory published in the United States.
On the whole, the U.S. legal academy produced few significant
responses to Kelsen’s legal philosophy. However, the problem is
not simply one of accommodating Kelsen’s approach to common
law theory or to an Anglo-American tradition of jurisprudence.
The U.S. legal academy is not a political or a methodological
monolith. Kelsen’s politics were not outside of the mainstream,
and his neo-Kantian approach to legal theory, while perhaps not as
35

PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRISIS OF
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
WEIMAR CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997).
36
Calsamiglia, 13 RATIO JURIS, at 197. Métall provides a listing of
over 600 works that Kelsen published up to 1966, but the list includes
translations and book reviews. See Métall, at 124-155.
37
See, e.g., ESSAYS ON KELSEN (Richard Tur & William Twining
(ed.)) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); LAW, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER : ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS KELSEN
(Salo Engel (ed.)) (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press,
1964).

12

[MARCH 2008]

accessible as that of American or English legal philosophers who
worked in the more familiar tradition of twentieth-century AngloAmerican philosophy, is not so obscure as to be incomprehensible
to the serious student of jurisprudence. Leading philosophers of
law in England wrote at length on Kelsen.38 And so, while
philosophical and political opposition to Kelsen is certainly
significant, we must also look to other factors in order to more
fully comprehend why Kelsen and his work have been largely
ignored within the U.S. legal academy.
II. KELSEN AND THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION
Part I of this Essay summarized familiar arguments that explain
Kelsen’s lack of influence on the U.S. legal academy and the U.S.
legal profession more generally. In this Part, the Essay explores
additional explanations for Kelsen’s lack of influence, sounding in
the sociology of both the legal profession and the legal academy in
the United States. The aim here is not to discount the significance
of the political and theoretical obstacles to the reception of
Kelsen’s theory in the United States. Rather, this Part aims to
supplement our understanding of the myriad reasons for Kelsen’s
failure to have an impact on the intellectual life of his adopted
home. In so doing, this Part offers a case study in the sociology of
knowledge and the ways in which, as a necessary part of the
process of the formation of a professional ethos or ideology,
certain modes of thinking and interacting must be rejected as
outside the realm of acceptable professional approaches to the
relevant subject matter.

38

See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Kelsen Visited and Kelsen’s Doctrine of the
Unity of Law, reprinted in H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), at 286-342; JOSEPH
RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) (discussing
Kelsen’s legal system at 93-120).
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A. Legal Education: From Trade School to Professional Training
1. The Transformation of Legal Education in the Early 20th
Century United States
Legal education in the United States took a different path from
that followed in Europe. While law was one of the four
foundational faculties of the medieval European university,39 it
was never integrated into traditional undergraduate education in
the United States.40 Rather, legal education developed along the
lines of trade education.41 Before the Civil War, only 9 of 39 U.S.
jurisdictions required some sort of legal education as a necessary
qualification for admission to the bar, and the bar examination was
oral and casual.42

39

The University of Bologna granted degrees in the arts, medicine and
theology, but it was “pre-eminently a school of civil law.” CHARLES
HOMER HASKINS, THE RISE OF UNIVERSITIES (3d ed.) (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press 1957), at 11-12. By 1231, the University of
Paris was divided in the four faculties of arts, law medicine and theology.
Id. at 16. See also Juergen R. Ostertag, Legal Education in Germany and
the United States – A Structural Comparison, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 301, 306-07 (1993) (“The continental medieval university considered
law to be one of the classic faculties . . . .”). This division of continental
European universities into faculties was still in effect during Kelsen’s
lifetime. Stefan Riesenfeld, A Comparison of Continental and American
Legal Education, 36 MICH. L. REV. 31, 33 (1937).
40
See STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 35-36 (noting that law instructors
sometimes taught as adjuncts at universities, which lacked law faculties
and that students “chose either law school or college, not both”).
41
Andrew Siegel, the historian of the Litchfield Law School, the first
such school in the United States, describes it as “a trade school for welleducated young men, a social club where life long connections were
formed and a propaganda mill for the Federalist vision of the social
order.”
Andrew M. Siegal, “To Learn and Make Respectable
Hereafter”: The Litchfield Law School in Cultural Context, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1978, 1981 (1998).
42
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 25.
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This changed markedly in the two decades after the Civil War,
as some sort of legal study or apprenticeship became mandatory in
the majority of jurisdictions and a written bar examination became
mandatory in all jurisdictions.43 Still, although Harvard’s law
school offered a three-year post-graduate degree by 1899, twenty
years later, only a handful of universities required an
undergraduate degree as a pre-requisite to the study of law.44 At
the beginning of the 20th century, law schools were still accepting
students who could not gain admission into undergraduate
programs at the same universities, and there were even concerns
that universities were using their law schools to admit athletes
otherwise underqualified for admission.45 As law schools began
requiring at least some college education as a pre-requisite to
admission in the first decades of the 20th century, enrollments
dropped by more than 50 percent.46 But the victory of the Harvard
model was eventually completed. During the 1920s, the American
Bar Association (ABA) adopted a policy limiting access to the bar
exam to students who had at least two years of college before
entering law school. The American Association of Law Schools
(AALS) fell in line, as its members made the completion of two
years of college a pre-requisite to law school admission.47 By midcentury, legal education in the United States invariably involved
full-time, three-year day programs enrolling almost exclusively
college-graduates, all of whom studied a nearly-identical
curriculum of private law subjects.48

43

Id.
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2. Kelsen’s Method and the Case Law Method
At the same time as Harvard Law School was spearheading the
standardization of legal training, it was also effecting a revolution
in legal pedagogy. This was the so-called case method of teaching
developed by Harvard’s Christopher Columbus Langdell.
Langdell’s pedagogy was an inductive method based on the natural
sciences.49 Students were expected to experience the development
of legal rules through an intensive study of case law rather than by
learning legal principles from the study of a treatise.50 Full-time
law instructors who increasingly came to view themselves as
scholars replaced part-time teachers who primarily viewed
themselves as practitioners.
Harvard’s approach did not
immediately win over the academy and the legal profession. On
the contrary, the case method was challenged both within Harvard
and in the wider legal community. The Boston University Law
School was founded in response to Boston practitioners’ dismay at
the “technical and historical” orientation of Harvard’s approach to
legal education.51 Tensions over this teaching method separated the
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main organization representing U.S. lawyers, the ABA, and the 35
law schools organized in 1900 into the AALS.52
After the First World War, legal education quickly regularized
on the pattern established at the Harvard Law School. In schools
as disparate as the University of Montana and the University of
Alabama, deans looked to hire full-time faculty trained in the
Harvard teaching method.53 As other law schools increasingly
imitated the Harvard model, legal education was transformed.
Within fifty years, Langdell’s “method and curriculum had taken
over legal education” in the United States.54 As William LaPiana
put it, “A system of apprenticeship gave way to academic training
dominated by a new division of the profession—full-time teachers
of law.”55
Legal education in the United States on the Harvard model
attempted a synthesis of the law office internships that had been
the foundation for such education in the nineteenth century and a
rather naïve scientism, which the academy quickly outgrew with
the advent of Legal Realism. The case method was diametrically
opposed to the treatise-based education that preceded it and to the
methodology that continental law professors continued to employ
when Kelsen was teaching.56 Writing in 1938, Max Rheinstein
described “the main teaching method” in continental law schools
as “the systematic lecture course, where a large field of the law
would be treated as a coherent, logically structured whole with
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elaborate, clearcut concepts.”57
According to Rheinstein,
continental students did not habitually come to class especially
well prepared, as there were “no assignments to be worked and no
cases to be digested.”58 Where the case method was inductive, the
approach to legal education with which Kelsen was familiar was
deductive, based on code rules and treatises.59 Where the case
method focused on teaching real-life situations drawn from actual
cases, civil law education in Kelsen’s time was based on analysis
of concepts, which were compared or contrasted with other
abstract concepts, all of which were reconciled within a legal
code.60 Indeed, the case method was more generally ill-suited to
Kelsen’s favored topics: so-called “cultural courses,” such as
jurisprudence, comparative law or legal history. The Harvard
method regarded courses such as jurisprudence, philosophy of law,
comparative law, theory of legislation, and criminology as posing a
risk of dilution to the “general professional curriculum.”61
Thus by the time Kelsen arrived on the scene in the United
States, he was doubly dated. His deductive pedagogical approach
could not have been more alien to U.S. law students. Indeed, even
compared with Anglo-American legal philosophers, Kelsen’s
approach eschews concrete examples drawn from real or
hypothetical cases or scenarios. In addition, Kelsen’s system
proclaimed itself a science of law. His legal positivism could only
have struck his Legal Realist colleagues as a return to the naïve
57
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formalism of the previous generations. Even though Kelsen’s
notion of science had far more in common with the human
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) such as philosophy or history
than with the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) on which
Langdell based his approach to law, the distinction was likely lost
on Kelsen colleagues and students within the U.S. legal academy.
B. The Professionalization of Law and the Legal Academy
Kelsen entered into a legal culture in the United States that had
just completed a dual professionalization process. First, the legal
profession was put on a new footing, as legal education had been
standardized and barriers to entry had been raised so as to greatly
enhance the status of attorneys. In addition, a new profession
emerged as disciples of the Harvard pedagogical model assumed
full-time teaching positions at law schools throughout the country.
Because their professional status and prestige was dependent on
their dominance of a market in educational services, the new legal
professoriate jealously guarded its position against variant
approaches to the law and to legal education.
1. The Development of the Legal Profession
Following Magali Sarfatti Larson, we can conceive of the legal
profession as a group of trained experts attempting to establish a
monopoly over a market in services. According to Larson, the
medical profession was best able to establish such a monopoly
because the demand for medical services is always high and
because the skills of medical professionals cannot be subjected to
peer review as easily as can the work of, for example, lawyers,
architects or engineers. 62 Moreover, the demand for the type of
services offered by other professions is not as stable as is the
demand for medical care. The key to control over a market for
professionals other than medical professionals thus becomes
control over the production of producers. By limiting the supply of
62
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credentialed practitioners, professionals such as lawyers and
engineers assure themselves a favorable bargaining position in the
market for their knowledge and services.63
Generally, expertise, credentialing and autonomy set
professions apart from other occupations. Professional expertise
and credentialing differ from the training and licensing of
craftsmen, technicians, or managers in that they are generally won
through schooling rather than through on-the-job experience. In
addition, professional education usually includes a measure of
theory and the initiation into a professional jargon.64
The Langdellian legal academy brilliantly illustrates these
principles. When Langdell arrived on the scene, attorneys were
not the respected professionals that they are today. Moreover,
because there were few barriers to entry, practitioners suffered
prodigiously during economic slowdowns. By mid-century,
however, the Langdellian revolution was completed. One knew,
when one hired a U.S.-educated attorney that he (and it was almost
certainly a he) had completed an undergraduate education as well
as a three-year course of law school and that he had also passed a
rigorous, written examination administered by the state bar
association, access to which was, for the most part, restricted to
those who had completed a course of study in an accredited law
school. Those law schools provided a sort of professional training
and credentialing that was specifically designed to elevate the
status of the legal profession above that of ordinary laborers or
craftsmen.
As Larson points out, professions do not so much meet existing
needs as shape or channel the needs of consumers by changing the
criteria for an acceptable quality of life.65 In order for a profession
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to succeed, it needs to convince society as a whole that its services
are necessary and that only people with a certain kind of expertise
and credentialing are qualified to provide such services. Larson
divides the characteristics of professions according to their
cognitive, normative, and evaluative dimensions:
The cognitive dimension is centered on the body of
knowledge and techniques which the professionals apply in
their work, and on the training necessary to master such
knowledge and skills; the normative dimension covers the
service orientation of professionals, and their distinctive
ethics, which justify the privilege of self-regulation granted
them by society; the evaluative dimension implicitly
compares professions to other occupations, underscoring
the professions' singular characteristics of autonomy and
prestige.66
The cognitive attributes of the professions are perhaps most
obvious to the uncritical observer. Professionals undergo highly
specialized and advanced education, and this education legitimizes
the normative and evaluative advantages professionals enjoy. It
was thus crucial to the legitimacy of the legal profession in the
United States that legal education become graduate education and
that the qualifications of lawyers be standardized.
But professionals themselves see their positions as a “calling”
and as a responsibility.
They abide by special codes of
professional conduct, and they are committed to a certain degree of
altruism or public service. The rise of the Harvard model thus
coincided with the ABA’s promulgation of a code of professional
ethics, which was quickly adopted at the state level.67 Once
adopted, this code of ethics remained in place, unchallenged for
over half a century.68 The twentieth-century legal profession
quickly developed into a stable structure. Lawyers shared a
66
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common professional ethos that remained unchanged for
generations. That ethos was tied both to the status of lawyers as
professionals engaged in an altruistic calling, a public service, and
to the high status of lawyers as members of an exclusive
association of trained experts.
Finally, professionals are evaluated through rigorous
competency tests and examinations, which result in their eventual
licensing. In order for the legal profession to enjoy enhanced
status, it was thus necessary for bar examinations to become more
regularized across the country. Indeed, bar exams became more
rigorous during the Great Depression of the 1930s, as state bar
associations came to view the exam as a means to restrict entry
into the profession while also shielding the public from
incompetent attorneys.69 Those who acquired the cognitive,
normative and evaluative attributes that came to be associated with
the legal profession reaped significant rewards in terms of high
social prestige, relatively high economic rewards, and autonomy.
2. The Creation of the Profession of Legal Scholars
While the specifics of the professionalization of legal scholars
are unique, that process is also part of a trend whereby academic
disciplines were professionalized in the United States beginning in
the nineteenth century.70
Like all professions, the legal
professoriate needed to create an identifiable product, exclude
competitors from the market for their product and create a
professional ideology and ethos to justify their domination of that
market.71 In law, the professionalization process was twofold, as
creation of a new academic discipline of legal scholarship
69

STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 178.
For a good discussion of the process of professionalization in the
social sciences in the United States, see Dorothy Ross, The Development
of the Social Sciences, in THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN
MODERN AMERICA, 1860-1920(Alexandra Oleson & John Voss, ed.)
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 107-38.
71
Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders, 35 J. LEG. EDUC., at 320
(relying on Larson’s analysis in THE RISE OF THE PROFESSIONS).
70

22

[MARCH 2008]

accompanied the strengthening of the professional ethos among
practicing attorneys. Langdellian teacher/scholars sought to
remove teachers/practitioners from their midst while also
convincing non-teaching practitioners that their pedagogical
methods would result in better-trained lawyers, indeed in an
entirely better breed of attorneys. Like other professionalizing
professoriates, legal scholars sought to delineate their turf by
associating it with a certain type of individual—the legal scholar—
and to eliminate their amateur predecessors from that turf.72
Through the case method, Langdell and the Harvard Law
School not only solidified the professional status of lawyers, it also
created a new profession—that of full-time law teachers.73 In
order to do so, it had to overcome significant opposition from
adherents of older, less successful professional models.74 When
Kelsen arrived in the United States, the profession of legal
academics had just emerged victorious in a bruising struggle
against all comers—including formalists and devotees of deductive
teaching methods as well as practitioners who wanted legal
education to continue to take the form of a vocational
apprenticeship. The legal academy was effectively closed to
methodological, pedagogical and theoretical perspectives that
might have threatened the ascendancy of the newly created legal
professoriate.
Indeed, because certain modes of discourse,
associated with the case method, Socratic teaching approaches, and
Realism had become associated with the ethos of legal academia,
the alternative approaches to legal theory and to legal education
that Kelsen represented threatened to undermine the status and
authority of the new legal professoriate.
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In their analyses of professional behavior, sociologists now
increasingly focus on expertise, prestige, and the creation of
monopolies over markets or expertise.75
The core of
professionalization is the monopolization of the processes that lead
to the production of professionals in a given field or practice.
Universities come to monopolize not only the processes through
which professionals receive credentials essential to their
employment but also the production of knowledge in a given field.
Modern professions are structures that link “the production of
knowledge to its application in a market of services” and
universities become “the training institutions . . . in which this
linkage is effected.”76 Such a monopoly over a market in services,
and over the educational structures supporting such a market,
increases the distance between professionals and the lay people
they serve, thus enhancing the status and authority of
professionals.
In introducing the case method as the core of legal education,
Langdell assumed the role as initiator of a discursive practice. As
Michel Foucault has described them, discursive practices “are not
purely and simply ways of producing discourse.” Rather they
“become embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in
patterns for general behavior, in forms for transmission and
diffusion, and in pedagogical forms.”77
There has been
extraordinary stability in legal education since Langdell’s time.
Not only has there been remarkably little change in the pedagogy
and curriculum of U.S. law schools, some of the cases included in
casebooks and taught in private law courses in Langdell’s era are
still staples of legal education today.78 Langdell’s discursive
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practice in the realm of legal pedagogy has survived despite its
association with an outmoded legal formalism.79 The U.S. legal
profession was transformed in myriad ways as a result of the
Langdellian innovations begun at Harvard. That transformation
could not stop to pause and consider Kelsenian perspectives.
CONCLUSION
The limited literature on the Kelsen reception in the United
States largely explains his small impact on the U.S. legal academy
in terms of the political and philosophical rejection of his legal
theory. But that explanation is inadequate. Kelsen’s politics were
not out of the mainstream. He, like many leading German legal
positivists, demonstrated his personal refusal to accommodate his
approach to that of the Nazis, and he suffered for his principled
opposition to the Nazi version of law. Only a tiny minority of U.S.
legal professors could articulate criticisms of Kelsen’s legal
philosophy that would not also be criticisms of H.L.A. Hart’s legal
philosophy. Yet, Hart’s jurisprudence is usually at the center of
such discussions of legal theory as take place in U.S. law schools.
Political and philosophical opposition to Kelsen’s perspectives
certainly existed, but that opposition provides only a partial
explanation of U.S. legal community’s persistent ignorance of
Kelsen’s thought.
It is thus useful to supplement discussions of political and
philosophical opposition to Kelsen with a sociological perspective.
Kelsen had little impact in the U.S. legal academy not only
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because his brand of legal positivism was uncongenial to a U.S.
audience. He also had little impact because he arrived in the
United States just as the twin innovations of Legal Realism and the
professionalization of legal academy were solidifying their
monopolistic grips on the U.S. legal community. His mode of
legal thought and his approach to legal education could not be
accommodated within the newly-created discursive practice of the
legal professoriate, and there was thus little possibility that he
could be discussed or taken seriously in that realm.

